REMARKS

Claims 1, 2, 12, 13, 23, and 33 are amended. Claims 1-45 are now pending in the application. Each issue raised in the Office Action mailed May 14, 2008 is addressed hereinafter, in order of appearance.

I. ISSUES NOT RELATING TO PRIOR ART

The specification stands objected to as failing to provide proper support for Claim 13. Specifically, the objection states that Claim 13 discloses a computer readable storage medium, but this term is not disclosed in the specification (Office Action, Page 2, Section 2).

This assertion is respectfully traversed. Applicant is not required to use the exact language of the specification "ipsis verbis" within the claims (*Ex parte Eggleston* (B.P.A.I. 2005), see also *Ex parte Holt*, 19 USPQ2d 1211 (BPAI 1991)). The specification repeatedly refers to computer readable media, for example, at paragraphs [0104-0107], and also discusses storage within these paragraphs and elsewhere. For example, paragraph [0104] of Applicant's specification discusses one example of a computer-readable medium being a storage device 1910. Similarly, paragraph [0105] of Applicant's specification discusses a computer-readable medium taking many forms, including but not limited to, non-volatile media, volatile media, and transmission media. Non-volatile media includes, for example, optical or magnetic disks, such as storage device 1910.

Further, Applicant's specification at paragraph [0106] states that "common forms of computer-readable media include, for example, a floppy disk, a flexible disk, hard disk, magnetic tape, or any other magnetic medium, a CD-ROM, any other optical medium . . . a RAM, a PROM, an EPROM, a FLASH-EPROM", all of which are types of storage media.

Consequently, Applicant's use of the term computer-readable storage medium is fully supported within Applicant's specification. For at least the above reasons, the rejection of Claim 13 under 35 USC §101 is unsupported and should be withdrawn.

Claims 14-22 are objected to as failing to provide proper antecedent basis for the claimed subject matter (Office Action, Page 2, Section 3). Applicant addressed this objection in the Response filed November 15, 2007. In July 2008, the Examiner Nicholas Augustine communicated to Applicant via telephone that this objection is considered to be resolved.

II. ISSUES RELATING TO PRIOR ART

Claims 1-45 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as allegedly unpatentable over Underwood et al (US 6,697,825) in view of Bowman, Michel K. (US 2003/0058277 A1). The rejection is respectfully traversed.

Claim 1 is repeated below for convenient reference.

- A system for generating a graphical user interface for an application program, comprising:
- one or more business objects that define functions of the application program; one or more metadata elements defining parameters for the functions of the business object;
- a controller configured for invocation by a browser and communicatively coupled to one or more actions, widgets, and panels;
- a service object manager coupled to the controller and to the business objects, and configured to supply service object parameter values from the business objects and metadata elements to the actions;
- wherein the controller comprises logic configured to **receive a user request from the browser** and to dispatch the user request to one or more of the actions;
- wherein the actions comprise logic configured to interact with the business objects through the service object manager to obtain service object parameter values for the actions;
- wherein the controller comprises logic configured to associate the service object parameter values with one of the widgets, to place the one of the widgets in one of the panels, and to **generate at runtime an HTML user interface page** that includes the panel;
- wherein at least one of the widgets has the capability of representing properties of the business objects as HTML.

From the above it is apparent that the claimed HTML user interface page is generated at run-time, not at build-time or compile-time. Applicant's approach is especially powerful where certain user inputs and parameters are unknown until runtime (Applicant's specification, paragraph [0068]).

In rejecting the highlighted portions of Claim 1, the Office Action relied on various portions of Underwood's columns 41 and 42 (Office Action, page 4). However, these sections describe a Site Definer used for editing and generating a web site (col. 28, lines 36-40). For example, Underwood discloses View, Edit, Publish, Edit Component, and Insert Component modes (col. 41, lines 21-25). As their titles imply, these modes are operated by builders/architects (not end-users) of websites, and thus are not involved in the end-user run-time aspects of the resulting website.

The preamble for Claim 1 recites "a system for generating a graphical user interface for an application program, comprising:", while the preambles for Claims 2 and 12 read "a method of automatically generating a consistent user interface for an application program, the method comprising the computer-implemented steps of:". Additionally, as shown in bold above, Claim 1 recites "receiv[ing] a user request from the browser and dispatch[ing that] user request to one or more actions". Thus, Applicant's recurring use of the term "user interface" should be interpreted as the eventual end-user of the application program, and not the architect or builder of an application program, as is referred to within Underwood.

Additionally, Underwood discloses meta-data for generating requisite HTML (col. 41, lines 63-64; col. 42, line 18). However, Underwood's generation of HTML does not result from "receiv[ing] a user's request" as claimed. Although Underwood refers to a "user", that user is developing and building a website using the Site Definer, but is not the intended end-user of the

Ser. No. 10/676,718 Attorney Docket No. 50325-0820

website. Thus, within the above, Underwood's "user" really means "builder", while the claimed user means an end-user as meant by the claimed term "user interface".

Thus, the system of Claim 1 creates new HTML code, and does so at run-time.

Meanwhile, Underwood generates HTML code only at build-time, but does not discuss run time at all. Neither Underwood nor Bowman contemplate run-time generation of code. As stated, Applicant's approach is especially powerful where certain user inputs and parameters are unknown until runtime.

From the above it is also apparent that the claimed "HTML user interface page" does not get generated until after a user's request (meaning end-user, not builder/architect) is received through a browser. Within either Underwood or Bowman, all HTML is generated during the building (not end-use) of their respective applications. Thus, applying Underwood and/or Bowman to Claim 1 ignores the sequence of events recited therein.

For at least the above reasons, the rejections of Claims 1-45 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are unsupported and should be withdrawn.

III. CONCLUSIONS & MISCELLANEOUS

For the reasons set forth above, all of the pending claims are now in condition for allowance. The Examiner is respectfully requested to contact the undersigned by e-mail or telephone relating to any issue that would advance examination of the present application. As per MPEP Chapter 5, Applicant acknowledges that Internet communications may not be secure.

A petition for extension of time, to the extent necessary to make this reply timely filed, is hereby made. If applicable, a check for the petition for extension of time fee and other applicable

111

111

Ser. No. 10/676,718 Attorney Docket No. 50325-0820

fees is enclosed herewith. If any applicable fee is missing or insufficient, throughout the pendency of this application, the Commissioner is hereby authorized to any applicable fees and to credit any overpayments to our Deposit Account No. 50-1302.

Respectfully submitted,

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